Tom Cotton’s war on reality: The GOP will recognize no limits
The extreme right will risk global conflict to preserve the fading dream of America’s eternal hegemony
That letter Republican senators, 47 of the 54 now seated, sent to Iran this week to sabotage the Obama administration’s nuclear talks is preposterous in numerous dimensions. Apart from the protocol breach and the naked politics of the piece, we are now on notice that the extreme right in our great country will risk global conflict, possibly nuclear, to preserve the fading dream of America’s eternal hegemony.
When a constituency of any kind is willing to put war and peace on the table to advance an agenda in the service of narrow interests, you are advised that it recognizes no limits. This is the subtext of the GOP’s screed, ridiculous and frightening all at once. Read it here. It is a classic case of the syndrome John Mearsheimer identified in “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics,” his 2001 book. When emerging powers challenge great powers, desperation arises.
Those who elected these people have a lot to answer for now. In this case, they subvert not only a highly promising foreign policy innovation but the constitutional arrangements that give this nation what governing structure survives its multiple corruptions. I rank the letter with the election the Supreme Court — along with Jeb Bush, James Baker and Katherine Harris—ripped off in 2000.
Two autumns ago, when Hassan Rouhani, Iran’s reformist president, appeared at the U.N. to open the diplomatic door, I argued in this space that the danger of failure lay not in Iran’s “hard-liners” but in America’s. And here we are. This nation’s cult belief in the sanctity of violence as a religious and ideological instrument could now go operational once again.
Anyone who does not yet understand that we live amid a very hot war between past and future cannot be fully alert. And if we look at it this way, Iran is but one theater in America’s global conflict with reality.
I see another across the Pacific, where Washington simply cannot accept China’s historically inevitable emergence, and where it deludes itself into thinking India is always just about to abdicate the independence of mind it has honored since Nehru to make itself another neoliberal clone, “just like us.”
In spades, I see another in the dangerous face-off with Russia, which Washington has assiduously provoked for the whole of the post-Soviet period. It is all in the documents and the books of the better historians (of which but a few). This is an open-and-shut instance, evident now in every day’s newspapers.
At the moment, this nation’s quarrel with the world as it is becoming is most critical and dramatic in Europe. This may surprise. There is no threat of war. And no, I do not suggest that in its nostalgia and irrationality Washington will sunder the Atlantic alliance itself. That will hold, for better or worse.
But it is between American and Europe that the seismic rumbles are deepest. It is across the Atlantic that the long-term reality facing America is clearest: This is the reality of creeping isolation—in every case by way of America’s own doing. When you have to worry about your oldest friends as well as all the enemies you have made, the rot in Denmark is pretty far advanced.
Within the bounds of the Western alliance, it is now unmistakable that the Europeans are in pursuit of two things: redefinition and distance. In plain English, they have had it with America’s war-mongering in its heightened, post-Sept. 11 phase.
There is immense promise in this, in my view, and for this reason I favor the drift newly evident in trans-Atlantic ties. Europe now appears to entertain an ambition to stand against Washington as a counterbalancing power. Make this a reality and Europeans will also stand in de facto alliance with none other than Russia, China and other emerging powers implicitly or explicitly challenging American primacy.
The promise is simply stated: It consists in the prospect of a more stable, less chaotic and less inflamed world community. Let’s look at this possibility while we can—before, that is, Washington sets the Middle East on a course of all-out nuclearization or it arms Ukraine.
At the start of the year this column predicted that one of two relationships would suffer a fissure in 2015. Either Europe’s ties with Russia or Washington’s with Europe were in for a rupture of one magnitude or another, Ukraine the catalyst in either case.
The better of these two—European impatience with American unruliness—is now in motion.
Two weeks ago, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, the German foreign minister, announced the completion of a yearlong project he called “Review 2014—Foreign Policy Thinking Ahead” when he took office in late 2013. Good enough to start with Steinmeier’s pithiest observation when he unveiled the result in a speech to the Bundestag: “The world has changed, and the Federal Foreign Office must change with it.”
I gloat when I read that sentence. In a few words Steinmeier, a Social Democrat in Chancellor Merkel’s two-striped coalition, confirms what is possible when leadership in the industrial democracies decides to face 21st century realities.
Then the gloating gives way to lament: We Americans are not permitted such leaders. The only changes we are encouraged to contemplate are those ostensibly justifying more weaponry in more places and more surveillance everywhere. To take Steinmeier’s position in Washington today would be tantamount to betraying the cause of “the indispensable nation.”
Steinmemeir’s report, titled “Crisis—Rules—Europe,” does a lot of things. It commits Germany to policy principles that have long been its under-the-surface preference, but submerged in deference to Berlin’s especially strong commitment to the Atlantic alliance. “I believe that foreign policy is about more than just two extremes: either just talking or shooting, either futile diplomacy or Bundeswehr deployments abroad,” Steinmeier told the German legislature.
German policy is now to rest on three core principles, as reflected in the title:
* Crises are a reality in our era are to be anticipated by way of intelligent, holistic analysis; military intervention is a very last resort. Causality is to be understood once crises erupt—this a huge transgression in the land of “decontextualization”—and they are to be ameliorated in the post-crisis phase by way of all available resources: intellectual, economic, social. Political solutions are to be paramount.
* International law and trans-national regulation—just as they are, no need for a lot more—are to be enforced more rigorously. This applies to adversaries and allies alike, and if you ask me it is aimed more at the latter than the former, one ally in particular.
* German policy is to be thoroughly embedded in the European context. Steinmeier was perfectly clear as to the Foreign Office’s intent in this respect: “to give Europe more influence in world affairs.”
One other feature of Berlin’s exercise in self-examination has to stand out for any paying-attention American. Steinmeier’s ministry put special emphasis on transparency and public input. The report was prepared after a year’s consultation across the board: with unionists, civil society groups, scholars, and ordinary citizens by way of town hall meetings in places large and small across Germany.
The whole exercise impresses me, the transparency aspect especially. By a long tradition, foreign policy in the Western democracies, not least in America, has been the purview of sequestered elites. Recognizing this as another kind of crisis in the context of globalism, Steinmeier’s thought is to make policy reflective of popular preferences. Take a minute to consider the difference this would make in America’s behavior abroad if the policy cliques answered to those who pay their salaries.
I take the Germans very seriously for several reasons.
First, the Steinmeier report is an implicit claim to European leadership, and if this is to hold Berlin must articulate convictions, ideas and intentions shared across the Continent. “Crisis—Rules—Europe” does this. I also read in the document a declaration that Europe intends to turn diffidently stated preferences into policies it advances with more determination than it has to date.
Second, there is a long history behind this moment. The Europeans were reluctant partners in the Cold War crusade for most of its duration, a point Americans do not much like talking about. The critique of America’s aggressions grew more evident as the years went by, and the European Union is vastly more integrated than it was when the Berlin Wall came down.