

As long as Stroessner and his henchmen are in power, however, Brasilia has nothing to fear. Any Paraguayan who dares openly to criticize the contract runs the same risk as did Robert Thompson Molinas, former editorial secretary of *ABC Color*, who was jailed for four months because the newspaper dared question its terms. While few Paraguayans have the temerity of Thompson Molinas, privately they are extremely bitter. "They have sold my children's birthright," complained an angry Paraguayan engineer. The payoffs to Paraguayan negotiators, according to inside sources, were more than \$1 million, and that is just the down payment in the graft that must be paid during the decade when Itaipu is in construction.

Itaipu is the biggest, most controversial sellout to date, but there are plenty of other, smaller deals for the ambitious; for example, land sales to Brazilians, even though they entail evicting the Paraguayan peasants on the land. In one recent incident near Villarrica, 250 peasants were forced at gunpoint to abandon 2,500 acres, so that the Paraguayan real estate firm, Ruis and Jorba, could sell the land to a Brazilian company. One of the largest local landowners, Gen. Otello Carpinelli, head of the II Military Region headquartered in Villarrica, has been accused of using troops to carry out evictions.

Twenty foreign companies, mostly Brazilian, now own 30 per cent of the nation's land, Paraguay's principal source of income and jobs. The statistics are even worse in the industrial and commercial sectors with twelve of the country's fifteen biggest companies in foreign hands. Ninety per cent of the banking and 80 per cent of the exports are controlled by foreigners, and now Stroessner is auctioning off the country's mineral resources.

Ignoring protests from the Paraguayan Steel Works (SIDEPAR), owned by the armed forces, Stroessner recently gave one of the juiciest contracts in Latin Amer-

ican history to the Anschutz Corp. of Denver, Colo.—a forty-year concession for all mineral rights in a 61,710-square-mile radius covering the eastern half of the country. SIDEPAR, formed to explore for minerals, was denied access to the area.

In return for this generous contract, Anschutz need only invest \$1.4 million, and that over a period of nine years. Royalties to the government will average 3 per cent of the gross profits until the company recovers its investment, when they may go as high as 10 per cent. (The usual starting figure for royalties from mining concessions in other Latin American countries is 66 per cent.) Anschutz is exempted from all taxes. Moreover, it has the right to expropriate any land deemed necessary for mining operations (guarantees for damages to third parties are a mere \$10,000). The Paraguayan Government also agreed to reimburse the company for any losses suffered from the "exhaustion of a mine."

Paraguay's opposition parties, outraged by this "scandalous gift," unanimously denounced a "contract that endangers the national sovereignty." Their protests hardly matter, however, since the U.S. Embassy and the Inter-American Development Bank approved the deal.

With gifts of this sort to be had, it is no wonder that Washington is uninterested in human rights. Business executives are concerned about profits, not political prisoners, and since business still directs U.S. Latin American policy, there can be no room for namby-pamby doubts about the moral issues involved. Besides, Stroessner is a staunch anti-Communist.

Americans frequently are puzzled by the hostility of other advanced nations, and most developing nations. "Why don't they like us?" I hear repeatedly. The answer is the friends we keep. Yesterday it was the Batistas and the Trujillos. Today it is the Stroessners and the Pinochets.

When will we learn? □

## Namibia: The Pretense of Concern

PATRICK L. SMITH

*United Nations, N.Y.*

Shuttle diplomacy and European conferences with southern Africa's white minority leaders were said to be the encouraging results of the "new African policy" Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger claimed to have launched in Lusaka, Zambia, on April 27. But after the three weeks of Security Council debates on South Africa's continuing presence in Namibia (South-West Africa), the Secretary's mission in southern Africa seems rather to have been to apply a new strategy to a very old policy, namely that outlined in the much publicized (and recently published) National Security Study Memorandum #39, written under Mr. Kissinger's supervision in 1969 and put into effect in the first months of 1970. Of the choices presented in that once confidential document, Option 2 was eventually

adopted. It called for "public opposition to racial repression but [the relaxation of] political and economic restrictions on the white states." The argument for that position was simple: "our tangible interests form a basis for our contacts in the region, and these can be maintained at an acceptable political cost."

The U.S. veto of the Security Council's resolutions calling for sanctions and arms embargoes against South Africa because it has failed to meet U.N. demands that it proceed to end its occupation of Namibia, was a significant demonstration of that policy's continuing efficacy in Washington. Before and during the debates, U.S. officials worked vigorously behind the scenes to stall the sessions and avoid the posture struck by a veto. The sessions were postponed twice and came close to cancellation, according to some sources here, before they finally convened on September 28. As the United States had anticipated, one African delegation after another began calling for the enforcement of Chapter 7 of the United

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Nations Charter—the one authorizing sanctions in areas where there is a significant threat to international peace and security. Those resolutions were finally put to a vote by Guyana on October 18; the U.S. veto, backed by Britain and France, followed immediately.

It was an important step for the African bloc. “We have been warned that the Western powers are going to veto,” said Theo-Ben Gurirab, head of the U.N. Observer Mission of the South-West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO), in an interview midway in the debates. “But it is important from the political point of view that we force them to veto, so that their intentions in the region are exposed. . . . There is a lot of talk, but there is very little action. The veto will help us expose this duplicity.”

U. S. Ambassador William Scranton, citing “the delicate fabric of negotiations,” told the Security Council, “Substantial progress has been made toward reaching a peaceful settlement to the Namibian problem in consultation with South Africa and the interested African parties. . . . We do not feel that the measures called for in the draft resolution before us will improve the chances to gain a free and independent Namibia.”

Mr. Scranton avoided all mention of the South-West Africa People’s Organization in his speech. Even South Africa has acknowledged that SWAPO, the broad political and military front that is recognized by the U.N. as the territory’s legitimate representative, has the support of an estimated 70 per cent of Namibia’s 900,000 Africans. But South Africa has effectively banned the organization since 1963, and has consistently refused to negotiate with its leaders.

That position had not changed by the day of the final voting here, and the U.S. veto. On the last day of the debate in the Security Council, *The New York Times* published an interview with Prime Minister Vorster, in which he spoke without qualification about negotiations: “I have nothing to say to SWAPO at all,” he told *Times* correspondent John F. Burns.

Sources in the African bloc assert that they were misled several times by the U. S. delegation. On one such occasion, an African minister was summoned to Washington, allegedly because South Africa had agreed, suddenly and inexplicably, to negotiate with SWAPO. Sanctions would, therefore, be unnecessary. A Security Council session—the one at which the question of sanctions was expected to be moved—had to be cancelled.

The claim turned out to be unfounded. It is possible also that Mr. Scranton’s claim of “significant progress” was a bit of deception. There has never been any evidence to support Mr. Kissinger’s boasts of progress on the Namibian question. The other implication in Mr. Scranton’s statement is that Washington approves of the “solution” for Namibia being imposed by South Africa.

Situated west of South Africa along the Atlantic coast up to Angola’s southern border, Namibia has been an effective buffer between South Africa and its northern neighbors ever since it was wrested from German control during World War I. In that half century or more, South

Africa and Namibia’s 90,000 whites have also developed considerable holdings in the area, notably in mining, fishing and sheep farming.

Copper has been mined extensively in the north-central region near Tsumeb since the early years of the century. The territory’s first uranium project, the \$220 million Rossing uranium mine, on the Atlantic coast some 40 miles north of Swakopmund, was due to begin delivering ore for processing in July of this year. The largest open-pit uranium mine in southern Africa, Rossing was launched by Rio Tinto-Zinc Ltd., a British multinational corporation, through agreements with the South African Government. Planned production for the mine is already committed through the late 1980s, and Britain, according to a report by its Atomic Energy Authority, has been counting on Rossing for at least half its uranium needs through 1982.

The Rossing project and its source of electric power are an interesting example of the kind of economic integration South Africa has been striving to effect between its own territory and that of Namibia. All the uranium mined at Rossing becomes, by agreement with the companies developing the site, the property of the South African Government once it emerges from the ground. It will be sold by the South African Government, even though Rio Tinto-Zinc owns a controlling interest—53.6 per cent—in the enterprise.

The Rossing plant will get its electricity from the Cunene River hydroelectric project at Ruacana Falls on the Angolan border. Vorster has steadfastly maintained that the dam was built for “the good of the people of South-West Africa,” and that South Africa would “gain nothing.” But indications are that the Rossing project and others like it are the beneficiaries of the \$720 million dam. And power grids already constructed will connect the dam with South Africa proper.

However, most sources interviewed at the U.N. in recent weeks agree that not economics but the strategic geopolitical position of Namibia has become South Africa’s principal motive for remaining there. Until the past few years, the territory’s position in the South African defense system has not been crucial. However, with the escalated independence processes in Portugal’s former African colonies, it became clear that a tranquil subcontinent, with white colonial regimes insulating South Africa from its black neighbors, would soon be a thing of the past. For that reason, in the view of one source here, “South Africa is not going to give up Namibia unless it is forced to—or unless it is forced to pay a very high price.” South Africa’s principal line of defense, this source points out, is still along the Angolan border with Namibia. There are no defensive positions along the

#### HAVE YOU THOUGHT

Of giving a Nation gift subscription to a friend? A subscription is an especially meaningful gift for a young person away at school, or to anyone you feel would benefit from the news and reviews published in *The Nation*.

Orange River, the South African border with Namibia.

Although South Africa's original mandate for administering Namibia was terminated by the U.N. ten years ago, it is only in recent months that Pretoria has shown interest in meeting any of the U.N.'s numerous deadlines for ending its control. Now, with the rapid changes occurring throughout the whole subcontinent, it has become obvious to Pretoria that a "solution" of one kind or another must be found in Namibia. Accordingly, a month after its first incursions into Angola in August 1975, South Africa launched a constitutional conference in Windhoek, Namibia's capital, for the professed purpose of determining the outlines of an independent Namibia.

From their inception, however, it was evident that the Turnhalle talks—named for an old German drill hall in which they are taking place—were designed to install a client regime in Namibia, a regime that would remain almost wholly dependent on South Africa economically and strategically, but which could be hailed by Pretoria as "independent." The conference demonstrates the crux of the South African strategy and, finally, the strategy of the United States: In southern Africa there is a vast difference between "black majority rule" and fundamental change; support for the former in no way implies encouragement for the latter.

In keeping with the apartheid system, for example, the Turnhalle talks were designed by South Africa along purely ethnic lines, even though the ethnic distinctions applied to Africans are not generally significant among Namibians. South Africa created eleven ethnic delegations, including that of the whites. The representatives of each ethnic group were hand-picked for pliancy by the white administration.

Once in conference, negotiations are carried out on a consensus basis, giving the white delegation, virtual veto power over any objectionable proposals the docile African "representatives" may be stirred to champion. For example, a series of talks was recently concluded on the present migrant labor system. African delegations had proposed its immediate abolition after "independence," but the white delegation argued that the system, known as contract labor, the backbone of the present white-controlled economy, was too efficient to be eliminated. No consensus was reached and the proposal was dropped.

Through the Turnhalle talks South Africa is attempting to answer the U.N.'s most recent deadline for significant progress toward U.N.-supervised national elections in Namibia, and an end to the South African administration and military occupation. On August 18, the "Constitutional Committee of the South-West Africa Constitutional Conference" issued a statement "reaffirming" the conference's "conviction that a real and permanent solution to our country's problems" can be found through the talks. There was no mention of elections in the statement, which was relayed here by the South African Mission. "Self-determination," it said, can be achieved by December 31, 1978, "with reasonable certainty." The date, more than two years away, came as a surprise at the United Nations, since mid-1977 was the target that had been anticipated.

It is now likely that the talks will produce an "interim government" prior to the date set for independence. The participants have already presented a draft constitution which would set up a bicameral legislature in Namibia, giving the majority one house and reserving the other for the white minority. This measure, says



"Dr. Kissinger, I Presume?"

The Washington Star

Sean Gervasi, a consultant in the Office of the Commissioner of Namibia, the U.N. body designated to administer the territory until the time of national elections, "raises the white minority constitutionally to a co-equal position of power."

"It's brilliant strategy," Gervasi concedes. "What is being sought is the establishment of a government which would be willing to continue with the present arrangements with South Africa. . . . There might be some lifting of restrictions on movement and things like that. But basically apartheid would remain in place."

More specifically, however, the *Windhoek Advertiser*, a relatively liberal daily published in the Namibian capital, reported on August 18 on details of a proposal for the interim government then being urged by four of the conference's ten African groups.

"Certain subjects would continue to fall under the jurisdiction of the Republic of South Africa," the *Advertiser* noted. "Control over any military or police force in South-West Africa; the entrance of immigrants or other persons; tariffs for customs and the control thereof; money and banking matters and the control of finances; the jurisdiction and structure of law courts; tax and income; the business of international matters; the administration, management and control of post and telegraphs, telephones and railways."

Whatever their internal faults, however, the chief shortcoming of the constitutional talks, in the Western view, has been their exclusion of SWAPO. The organization's absence has been the main blow to Turnhalle's credibility, and it is clear that the Kissinger effort has not been directed at any change in the nature of the talks, but only on cosmetic improvement of their appearance. "The problems remaining consist of finding a negotiating forum in which the nationalist group that is acceptable to African leaders, the South-West Africa People's Organization, can take part," Bernard Gwertzman wrote in *The New York Times* on September 12, "and in which South Africa would also be represented to work out such details as elections and the removal of South African forces from the territory."

In fact, there are now concrete indications that Kissinger's diplomacy has been part of a highly regulated, well-financed plan to by-pass SWAPO, prop up the Turnhalle talks, and make preparations for massive U.S. assistance to the "interim government" they will produce.

¶ According to current plans, the Namibian Government will be led by a white Prime Minister, Durk Mudge, and headed by a largely ceremonial President, Chief Clemens Kapuuo, the current head of the Herero delegation at Turnhalle. Although Kapuuo commands little support in his own community, an American public relations firm known as Psycomm has been flying him between Windhoek, London and Washington. He has had broad exposure to U.S. business interests and members of Congress, and at least one U.N. source has speculated on the close links that may exist between Psycomm and the CIA.

¶ The United States is preparing to provide "substan-

tial international assistance" to the interim government, once it is installed. According to a confidential document circulated to African delegations during the recent Security Council debates, a \$350,000 study project is being carried out by the Agency for International Development to determine ways whereby the existing economic infrastructure can be strengthened after independence. "It is probably not by accident," the document notes, "that a number of senior 'investigators' associated with the project have long records of involvement with the Central Intelligence Agency."

¶ According to the same document, the United States has proposed to train, finance and equip a "Namibian Army" that would make it possible for South Africa to withdraw its forces from the territory. A report from Zurich, where Kissinger and Vorster met, in the September 19th *Dublin Sunday Times*, written by a former U.N. adviser in Africa, provides more detail on the pledge:

A new black Namibian armed force would then be created, trained by United States military personnel, equipped by the U.S. and financed by the U.S. for at least a decade. What the limit would be on the number of United States military advisers is not known. It is intended that a large proportion of the American soldiers and other personnel working in Namibia should be black.

Internationally and in its own press, South Africa has preferred to concentrate on the constitutional talks and their developments, rather than on its rapidly escalating war with SWAPO. But there is growing evidence that the war in the northern Ovambo and Okavango regions and in the Caprivi Strip to the east has reached critical proportions. In mid-May, the *Rand Daily Mail* reported that "the tightest security control in South-West African history has been imposed on Ovambo and a virtual state of emergency exists in the troubled area. . . ." Shortly thereafter, South Africa created its present 1,000-mile "free fire zone," a half-mile-wide strip running the length of Namibia's northern border.

On June 22, the *Windhoek Advertiser* appeared with a blank front page. Its German-language affiliate, *Allgemeine Zeitung*, was suppressed before it could be distributed. "A report yesterday about infiltration of armed insurgents could result in dejection among the general public," a court statement said of the seizure of the *Zeitung*. The editor of the *Advertiser* ran a front-page editorial in his June 23rd edition: "My motivation to publish stemmed from the simple fact that the authorities are failing to keep the inhabitants of this country informed about the true state of affairs."

In the same issue it was announced that the South-West Africa Anti-Terror Fund would offer "R10,000 [about \$12,000], immediately payable, to any person giving information which could lead to the detection of any terrorist or terror band south of the Ovamboland border." Sources at the U.N. believe the suppressed story to have been an account of a major battle between SWAPO guerrillas and South African counterinsurgency forces near Tsumeb, a mining town in the "white area" south

of the Ovamboland border. If so, it was one of SWAPO's deepest penetrations into white-controlled areas.

Estimates compiled by the U.N.'s Office of the Commissioner of Namibia place the number of increasingly well-armed and well-trained SWAPO guerrillas now operating in northern areas at 3,000 to 5,000. They quickly add, however, "That's a low-range estimate," based on figures released by the South African Defense Department. Estimates of the number of South African troops now active in Namibia run to 50,000.

U.N. sources also point to the vast complex of South African Army bases developed in northern Namibia in the past five years, and the secondary outposts that literally dot a map of the Ovambo and Okavango border areas. But perhaps more alarming than the rapid escalation of the South African military presence in Namibia is the increased flow of Western arms to South Africa's defense system.

Chief among these developments is the electronic sensor system supplied to South Africa by Marconi Communications Systems Ltd. In direct violation of already declared arms embargoes, the British corporation is helping to construct a monitoring system that has turned the whole of northern Namibia into an electronic battlefield. It has also been reported that Israel is supplying South Africa with defense-related electronic equipment. Investigative sources in Washington said recently that AEG-Telefunken, the West German electronics manufacturer, "may be even more deeply involved than Marconi."

Sean Gervasi and others view this as "direct military involvement" in South Africa's war with Namibia. And they add that there are "hundreds of subterranean rivers" of indirect military supply. "Virtually every major piece of military equipment that the South Africans have has come in the past five or six or ten years from the United States, Britain, France, West Germany or Italy," Gervasi maintains. He gives an example: "There is a very modern U.S.-armored personnel carrier called the V 150 Commando that's produced by the Cadillac Gage Co. in Detroit. We don't know how they arrived in South Africa, but they are produced only by Cadillac Gage, and we know that South Africa has at least 100 of them and that some have been used in Namibia."

SWAPO did not become an active military organization until August 1966, when the decision was taken to launch the guerrilla war that has now endured continuously for ten years. Eleven years of political and diplomatic agitation preceded that decision.

In 1955, Namibian migrant workers on contract in the Cape Province of South Africa had founded the Ovambo People's Organization. In the years of its first formation, the organization was strongly influenced by South Africa's African National Congress, one of the oldest African nationalist organizations on the continent. Even during its last years as the OPO, the organization had taken on a strong national character, had taken members of Namibia's various ethnic groups, and had widened its horizons from opposition to the contract labor system, to apartheid, to the entire colonial system

prevailing in Namibia. SWAPO emerged from the OPO in 1960, an explicitly nationalist group.

SWAPO's strong nationalist stand is vividly expressed in its view of the Turnhalle conference or other proposed forums of negotiations with South Africa. "We do not in any way consider the crowd that's meeting in Windhoek to be representative of the interests and aspirations for freedom and independence of our people," SWAPO's Gurirab, who has recently become head of the organization's political bureau, told me in a recent interview. "It is not only SWAPO that has said so but the various communities inside Namibia have also rejected and condemned the people who are meeting there."

One proposal that the United States has been batting about recently has been for SWAPO to meet with South Africa in Geneva as one of some twenty delegations. Although SWAPO has always maintained its willingness to negotiate with South Africa, Gurirab says: "We are obviously talking at cross-purposes here."

"Should South Africa and the Western countries that are exploiting the natural resources of our country feel that some of the puppets meeting in Windhoek are important to their purposes, then they can bring them as part of their own delegation and have them sit on their side of the table," Gurirab continued. "They would not be part of the Namibian delegation."

Would any such Namibian delegation include organizations other than SWAPO?

"We specifically have been impressed, encouraged, and inspired by the stance that the religious community has taken in Namibia," Gurirab said. "In spite of their impediments—their pacifism, for example—the religious leaders have come out in support of the struggle. And there are other small groups, some of them tribal, but which have been progressive. So when the principle [of negotiation] has been accepted, then we would sit down and decide who else should be included in the Namibian delegation at a conference."

But there are preconditions to SWAPO's willingness to negotiate, and those terms—including agreement on territorial integrity, the withdrawal of South African troops, and the release of political prisoners—are likely to preclude the possibility of bilateral negotiations. "These are conditions which South Africa really doesn't want to accept, and that's why it's important that SWAPO has stated them," the U.N.'s Gervasi notes. "The fact that South Africa won't accept them means that they cannot be incorporated into the constitutional arrangements being drawn together now." The organization's first goal after achieving independence is to hold the national elections that South Africa has refused to permit.

Until recently, SWAPO's military strategy—which has been viewed as much more important than its diplomatic efforts—has been to fight a low-intensity war in northern Namibia, predominantly in Ovamboland, the north-central province that South Africa declared a Bantustan in 1968. Because of Namibia's difficult terrain, SWAPO has not, until very recently indeed, penetrated far south, and has not sought to establish liberated zones.

But there are signs that the old strategy is changing, particularly with the availability of increased arms sup-

plies. "We are thinking in terms of launching very extensive operations in Namibia," Gurirab says, "and for that to be effective we have to plan, we have to train cadres, we have to arm them, and we have to provide both the political and military infrastructure that will enable us to advance and retreat, and accommodate any effort on the part of South Africa to break through our defenses.

"On the other hand," Gurirab continued, "as a result of our own intensification—the opening of new operational zones beyond what was our traditional zone of operation in the north—we have now moved south toward the center of our country. Because of these efforts on

the military front, South Africa has correspondingly expanded its military presence in Namibia."

Few observers of Namibia expect South Africa to succeed in containing the war they now believe to be far advanced already. With evidence growing of the sort of Western military supply now surfacing, the chief concern among those interviewed in recent weeks is what South Africa will do—and what will its allies do—as the situation deteriorates. In this context, the chief function of the "interim government" about to be installed may be to give South Africa, now fighting a "secret war," something "legitimate" to defend. □

## URBAN HOMESTEADING

# MAYBE THE BEST DEAL IN TOWN

### MARK T. ZIMMERMAN

When the government starts to give away houses for \$1 you know there's got to be a catch. There is. The houses are in need of repairs, which may cost \$3,000, \$10,000, or more in some cases. Not only that, the person who undertakes to make the repairs in return for ownership must also agree to live in the renovated house for at least three to five years.

Does it still sound good? It is. That's why more than 180 cities throughout the United States are considering urban homesteading. In 1975 the federal government approved a \$5 million appropriation to demonstrate the practicality of the idea in various settings of twenty-two major U.S. cities. It will also make HUD (Department of Housing and Urban Development) properties available to the cities that decide to try it. HUD holds title at present to some 250,000 houses, most of them acquired through defaults on FHA (Federal Housing Authority) loans.

Wilmington, Del. in May 1973, was the first city to enact an Urban Homesteading Act; it anticipated the federal government by almost two years. Wilmington, with a population of 80,000, holds title to between 1,500 and 2,000 abandoned houses. On August 24, 1973, the city gave away ten houses. In preparation for that day, advertisements had been placed in the local papers, advising interested applicants of the details, requirements and deadline. There were 300 applicants for the ten houses. The Wilmington Homestead Board reviewed the applications, taking into consideration family size, financial status, experience as tenants or owners, and construction skills; forty applicants survived this screening. When there was more than one qualified applicant for a given house, a lottery was used to decide.

The first house in the drawing, built in 1884, was awarded to Daniel S. Frawley, a 31-year-old attorney for E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. and his wife, Bonita, a

33-year-old schoolteacher in a Wilmington suburb. However, the house that they finally settled into was far from a gift; in fact they spent close to \$18,000 to renovate it completely, using for capital a combination of loans and savings.

"We could have done the minimum," says Frawley. "Spent \$6,000 to \$8,000, which is what a lot of Wilmington homesteaders are doing." But the Frawleys wanted more. They gutted the entire interior of the three-story house and rebuilt from scratch. Since they were both working at full-time jobs, most of the work had to be done on contract. They pitched in over weekends. When they had finished, they considered the house finer than the one they had sold in Devon, Pa. for \$45,000. Their monthly payments on the building loans amount to \$116.

As of December 1975, only twenty of the original thirty-five Wilmington homesteaders remained with the plan. Of those, twelve had completed the renovations and the other eight were expected to finish by the summer of 1976. The requirements for homesteaders in Wilmington are that they be at least 18 years of age, the head of a household, a U.S. citizen, that they agree to bring the house up to building code standards within eighteen months, and that they agree to live in the house for no less than three years. When the three years are up the city turns the title over to the homesteader. Wilmington gives the homesteader a tax break during the first five years by allowing the deduction of 50 per cent of repair costs from the assessed value.

On all major points, the Wilmington program is typical—since it was the first of its kind, many of its details have been copied in other cities. It is an appealing, even a heartening idea, but it never touches the core of the country's housing problem. All urban homesteading programs (with the exception of New York's) solicit young, middle-income, married couples. Since the cost of restoring an abandoned house can be considerable, it is generally felt that only middle-income families should attempt it. Also, many lower-income families would find

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